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Yudhoyono in 2004) has come as a direct result of the electoral process. 4 A more sober assessment of democratic consolidation thus suggests that Indonesia should probably be viewed as an emerging democracy. Despite the rapid progress of democratization to date, Indonesian democracy could not yet said to be truly consolidated, in the sense of democracy being considered the 'only game in town' and any reversion from it unthinkable. Nonetheless, particularly using a minimalist, Schumpeterian definition of electoral democracy, Indonesia has clearly made great strides in a relatively short period of time.
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In this essay, I argue that democratization in much of East Asia, including Indonesia, has opened up opportunities for political elites to engage in overt 'political engineering' -that is, the conscious design or redesign of political institutions to achieve certain specific objectives. In East Asia in general and Indonesia in particular, political engineering has predominantly been applied by incumbent politicians in the search for a more consolidated, aggregative and majoritarian political system that improves political stability while also limiting potential challengers to the established political order. The emergence of this distinctive regional model of institutional design has been facilitated by deliberate reform strategies whereby the region's electoral democracies have sought to transform the way their political systems operate in order to achieve certain specified outcomes -for instance, more stable government, stronger political parties, and so on.
Drawing on a book-length study, this essay examines the impact of these changes of 'political architecture' -"the complex of rules that make up the constitutional structure and party system" 6 -both in Indonesia specifically and in a comparative
context. This process of institutional reform was, at heart, an attempt to engineer political stability through the design of democratic institutions which reflects the 4 Indonesia's first democratically-chosen president, Abdurrahman Wahid, was elected by the members 4 interest of incumbent powerholders keen to protect their own positions. Political reformers have sought to encourage more majority-favouring elections, while encouraging nationally-focussed parties and limiting those based around regional or ethnic ties.
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Background
The Asian approach to political engineering illustrates one of the recurring themes animating the choice of political institutions: the trade-off between efficiency and representation. Classically, 'representational' institutions were considered to facilitate the direct translation of popular preferences and cleavages into the political sphere with as little interference as possible, via political parties representing distinct social groups, proportional representation elections, and low barriers to minority enfranchisement. Together, these institutions should ideally lead to the development of a diverse multiparty system in which all significant social groups and interests are separately represented. By contrast, 'efficient' institutions that can deliver clear parliamentary majorities offering distinct policy alternatives are more often associated with majoritarian elections and 'catch-all' political parties that command electoral support across social cleavages. In theory, these make it more likely that minority and majority interests alike will be aggregated into a few large parties which alternate in power over time.
By the terms of this long-running debate, most of the political reforms in the AsiaPacific over the past decade have clearly come down on the side of efficiency and against representation. The move away from proportional representation systems -in which each party receives seats in close proportion to their overall share of the vote, thus advantaging smaller parties and minorities -towards majoritarian ones, which tend to advantage large parties via 'winner-takes-all' outcomes -has been one of the Asia-Pacific's more striking reform trends. Major electoral system changes in Japan, for electoral success. In recent years increasing elite awareness of these problems, combined with the inevitable calculations of self-interested actors seeking to advance their own political prospects, have stimulated a search for appropriate ameliorative responses through changes to the rules of the democratic game. Across the region, these reforms typically sought to improve government stability, encourage party aggregation, restrict the enfranchisement of regional or ethnic minorities, and foster majoritarian political outcomes. Indonesia has taken these measures the furthest, introducing a range of reforms to voting rules, electoral arrangements and political party regulations that are all aimed to producing a more consolidated party system.
These will now be examined in more detail.
Electoral Reform
One particularly striking reform trend in recent years has been in the area of electoral system design. Because electoral systems determine how votes cast in an election are translated into seats won in parliament, they are the central 'rule of the game' determining who governs. The constituent elements of any electoral system -such as the formula for translating votes into seats, the way electoral districts are drawn, the structure of the ballot, and the extent to which voting is candidate or party-centredall exert an independent influence on the behavioural incentives facing political actors, and hence on the development of political parties and the kinds of campaign strategies and policy appeals they employ.
Despite the considerable differences in forms of government, political culture and democratic consolidation across the Asia-Pacific region, increasingly convergent reform patterns are evident, with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and proportional representation was adopted. This time, all candidates were chosen from party lists, but voters were able to influence the composition of these lists by voting directly for a chosen candidate. Again, the motivation for this reform -common in
Europe, but unique in the Asia-Pacific -was to give voters more influence over which candidates from a given party list would be elected, thus in theory strengthening the link between voters and politicians. As in 1999, however, this provision had a negligible influence on election outcomes: only two seats out of 500 were chosen this way, as an exceptionally large number of personal votes were needed to alter a candidate's position on the party list. In some ways this may have been fortunate, given that the broader thrust of electoral reform in Indonesia aimed to encourage party cohesion by centralizing control of party organizations -an objective incompatible with open list voting, which "allows entrants to free-ride on the party label while simultaneously encouraging them to curry a personal reputation for the provision of particularistic goods".
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Nonetheless, demand for some form of district-based system remains strong in Indonesia, fuelled in part by the expectation that democratic prospects would be enhanced if the power of party elites was reduced and politics brought closer to the masses. 19 In response to these widely-expressed sentiments, one reform that did get implemented was a drastic reduction in 'district magnitude' -that is, the number of members elected from each electoral district. 
Political Party Reforms
Scholars of democracy have long considered political parties to play a crucial role not just in representing interests, aggregating preferences, and forming governments, but also in managing conflict and promoting stable politics. However, the extent to which parties can play these roles varies significantly depending on the nature of the party system. In two-party systems, for instance, parties must cultivate and maintain support across a range of social groups to win elections, and therefore need to provide broad public goods -that is, goods which benefit everyone without exclusion, such as property rights, the rule of law, public education, health care, roads and other basic infrastructure -in order to maximize their chances of success. In fragmented multiparty systems, by contrast, parties may need only a small plurality of votes to win office, and can thus focus on providing sectoral benefits to their own supporters, rather than to the broader electorate. 22 This is a particular problem in culturallydiverse societies such as Indonesia's, as it means that political parties will often form around distinct social cleavages based upon ethnic, religious or regional differences. governments. Indeed, the development of such a national party system was seen as an essential step in countering secessionist sentiment and building a viable democracy.
To achieve these twin goals -promoting broad-based parties while resisting the emergence of separatist ones -Indonesia's political reformers introduced a complex 14 collection of incentives and restraints on party system development. On the one hand, all parties were required to demonstrate a national support base as a precondition for them to compete in the transitional 1999 elections. Under the new rules, each party was required to establish branches in at least one-third of Indonesia's (then) 27 provinces, as well as offices in more than half the districts or municipalities within these provinces, before they could contest the election. As King notes, "where previously the number of election contestants was stipulated by law, permitting only three, now they were limited on the basis of insufficient geographical coverage and depth of penetration of their organizations". 28 The bias in favour of national parties was so strong that regional parties were even banned from competing in elections to the regional assemblies, where again only national level parties were permitted. This takes the national bias in the electoral system to an extreme: instead of allowing regional governments to be representative of their own constituent populations, the law forces them to be comprised of the same parties which compete at the national level.
These new rules had an immediate impact on party numbers: of 141 parties that replicated the societal and religious cleavages present in 1955, the fact that the major parties were able to command such cross-regional support is actually a significant difference. 31 As well as being important for Indonesia's longer-term democratic prospects, this also had implications for electoral violence: as parties and candidates needed to have cross-regional appeal, election-related conflicts were for the most part "limited in number and local in scope". In sum, the major impetus behind the new Indonesian party laws was to reduce the overall number of parties, consolidate the party system, and make monoethnic, regionalist or separatist parties unviable. As a result, it is virtually impossible for a party to get its name on the ballot in Indonesia today unless it can demonstrate a level of national support that is likely to be beyond the reach of even the most well- percent of seats, will be entitled to enter candidates for the presidential and vicepresidential race. All of this not only discriminates against smaller parties, but tilts the electoral playing field markedly in favour of incumbents and established parties more generally.
Conclusion
As Larry Diamond has noted, a one paradox of democracy is that in some circumstances "a political system can be made more stably democratic by making it somewhat less representative". 33 This clearly has been the strategy pursued by many Of course, the fact that political reforms may have met some of their stated objectives does not mean that they are therefore the most desirable or appropriate models.
Whether this ambitious exercise in political engineering in itself will be enough to change the way party competition works and forge more durable and stable democratic politics remains to be seen, however. Indonesia's new laws have been rightly criticized for locking minorities out of power, and for placing unreasonably high hurdles in front of potential new parties. As one observer has noted, if the laws requiring parties to prove minimum membership numbers all the way down to the local district level are strictly enforced, "parties may, instead of collecting dues from members, be paying them to sign up in future."
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Similarly, restrictions on political fragmentation and ethnic politics can also have clear downsides. While they may improve the prospects for a nationally-consolidated party system, the new rules could also undercut the ability of all but a few established parties to form and mobilize support. If ethnic or religious groups are unable to 19 mobilize and compete for political power by democratic means, they will likely seek to achieve their objectives in other ways. A balance therefore needs to be struck between encouraging national parties, which is generally a positive strategy, and restricting regional ones, which can have clear downsides. The danger of overkillplacing so many incentives in favour of party aggregation and against regional or ethnic parties that they form a pattern of systemic discrimination and disempowerment -is clearly present.
